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EUROPEAN UNION
ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT OF GREEK FERRY OPERATORS
Jason Chuah
InDecember1998, the Commissionmade aDecision1pursuant toArticle 81EC (formerly Article 85,
EC) imposing various fines and penalties on a number of Greek ferry operators for tariff-fixing in
breach of competition law. A few of the operators brought actions for annulment against the
Commission.These included casesT-56/99,T-59/99,T-65/99 and T-66/99, judgments of11December
2003 (Marlines SA,Ventouris Group Enterprises SA, Strintzis Lines Shipping SA andMinoan Lines SA).
In the Marlines SA action, the company argued that it was unaware of the collusion that went on
between the larger companies; that it was prevailing practice for transport companies in the region
to exchange information on prices or on conditions of sale and transport; and that the official who
had agreed to the same tariffs was not authorised to do so. It also pointed out that as it was the
smallest participant in the cartel, its role was insignificant and the number of passengers affected
was negligible. The Court of First Instance rejected the company's action, holding that the
Commission had established clearly to the requisite legal standard that the company had
participated in a price cartel for ro-ro ferry services between Patras and Ancona. The court was
not persuaded that the fact the company was the smallest in the cartel was at all material in an
enforcement action for breach of Article 81 EC.Case law requires that where an infringement has
been committed by several undertakings, the Commission must take into account the role played
by each of the undertakings.The fact that the company concerned was p`erceived by its partners as
an undertaking whose opinion should be ascertained in order to establish a common position' was
indicative of its active and actionable participation.The company also relied on a technicality arguing
that the Decision had no effect on it as it was not established in Greece but in Liberia. It submitted
that the Decision had been adopted without its knowledge and it had been deprived of a chance to
respond to the allegations prior to the Decision.The court ruled that it was too late to raise such a
defence.Under the court's Rules of Procedure, such a pleamustbe put forward at the timewhen the
reply was lodged.
In Ventouris SA, the Court of First Instance made one concession to the applicant. It allowed the
company's application to have its fine reduced as it found that the financial penalty imposed on the
company was unfair. There was no justification for a penalty of the same severity as the other
participants when the company concerned was only charged with one infringement whilst the others
were chargedwith two.Ventouriswas onlyguiltyof fixing tariffs for the carriage of goodsvehicle; there
was no evidence that itwaspartof theprice fixing cartel in respectof passenger traffic.The courtheld
that in fixing the amount of the fine, the gravity of the infringementwas to be appraisedby taking into
account in particular the nature of the restrictions on competition, the number and size of the
undertakings concerned, the respective proportions of themarket controlled by themwithin the EU,
and the situation of the market when the infringement was committed.2 Additionally, it must have
regard to the principles of equity and proportionality. For that reason, it was wrong to punish the
company with the same severity as its fellow participants whowere guilty ofmore serious breaches.
1 Decision1999/271/EC (OJ1999 L109/24).
2 Case 41/69 Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, para.176.
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In Strintzis SA, it was argued that the Commission had wrongfully carried out investigations at
company premises other than those of the company to which the Decision was addressed. The
Commission had in fact searched the premises of ETA, an agent of Minoan, another defendant
company, and in the course of the search found incriminatory documentation relating to Strintzis.
The court held that as long as the undertaking's right of defence is not prejudiced, there was no
good reason to limit the Commission's right of access to documents.The court said:
It is [important] to preserve the effectiveness of investigations as a necessary tool for the Commission
in carrying out its role as guardian of theTreaty in competition matters . . . the right of access would
serve no useful purpose if the Commission's officials could do no more than ask for documents or files
which theycould identifyprecisely in advance.On the contrary, such a right implies thepower to search
for various items of informationwhich are not alreadyknown or fully identified.Without such power, it
would be impossible for the Commission to obtain the information necessary to carry out the investi-
gation if the undertaking concerned refused to cooperate or adopted an obstructive attitude ( Joined
Cases 46/87 and 227/87Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 2859).
As to whether the Commission should have withdrawn upon discovering that ETAwas a company
unrelated to Strintzis, the court held that the Commission was entitled to take the view that the
premises should be treated as being used by Minoan, one of the lead undertakings, for the conduct
of its business whichwas the subjectmatter of the investigations.
The casewasmade inMinoan SA that the company was clearlyone of the lead infringers of Article 81.
Aside from the argument that the Commission had infringed its rights by carrying out investigations
at premises of ETA instead of Minoan's own premises (which was dismissed by the Court of First
Instance on the above grounds), Minoan also argued that the Commission had failed to take into
account its willingness to cooperate with the Commission when setting the fine.The court did not
find evidence that the Commission had disregarded that factor when calculating the fines payable.
These cases reveal the disinclination of theCourtof First Instance to entertain too liberally an appeal
against the procedures or process of investigation undertaken by the Commission in carrying out its
duties under Articles 81and 82 EC.The court was concerned that the rules of procedure should not
be construed too strictly ^ it held that a purposive approachwas sufficient.The key issue is whether
the investigatory procedures undertaken would deprive the undertakings of natural justice. In most
cases, how the evidence came about was immaterial to the Court of First Instance; it was more
important that the undertakings be given an ample opportunity to respond to the evidence
produced. As for guidance on calculating fines, the court ruled that the Commission was fully
entitled and, indeed, duty bound to consider the entirety of the circumstances in deciding whether
a reduction in the penalty was warranted.
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